

SRU

-FULL TRANSLATION-

((Page 1 of O.T.))

RESOLUTION

ON THE MISSION OF THE ((REVOLUTIONARY)) GOVERNMENT.

(Resolution adopted by the congress of the province  
((possibly VC Binh Dinh Province Party Committee)) in Jan 71.)

The resolution is composed of two parts as follows:

PART ONE:

- I. GENERAL ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION IN 1970.
- II. ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AT ALL LEVELS.

PART TWO:

- III. MISSIONS OF THE ((LOCAL)) GOVERNMENT IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1971.
- IV. PLAN FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT FROM NOW UNTIL JUN 71.

I. GENERAL ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION IN 1970.

Since mid-1969, despite heavy failures, the enemy focussed all efforts on fiercely attacking us in military, political, and economic fields in mountainous and rural areas and province bordering areas. His objective was to carry out his special and accelerated pacification plans in order to destroy our village government and establish his village Puppet system to exert oppressive control over the people.

In liberated areas, in parallel with his repeated sweep operations, he assembled tyrants, exiled because of our previous attacks, and brought them to their local areas to form a key force against the people's revolutionary movement and establish a Puppet Government system in family groups and hamlets. He forced the members of revolutionary families to do the job of chief of family groups and hamlets. He tried to sow suspicion and dissension among the people. In addition, the enemy established secret Puppet Government systems, underground intelligence networks, and police sub-stations to suppress and control the people.

In enemy controlled areas, he tried to consolidate his village administrative councils which had been disorganized, rallied his new henchmen to exert oppressive control over the people, organized elections on behalf of members of the senate and house of representatives ((sic)), and carried out his demagogic plans in order to consolidate his government and win over the people.

CDEC DOC LOG NO. 04-1/00-71

Although the enemy succeeded in establishing espionage and administrative machineries in some areas, he failed to control and win over the people. The reason for this failure was that the henchmen in these machineries were hateful scoundrels and traitors.

((Page 2 of O.T.))

Therefore, the enemy established posts and key positions and supported the activities of his village Puppet Government. He used US, ROK, and RVN irregular forces to support his pacification program, and resorted to cruel military measures to enable his Puppet administrative personnel to oppress and suppress revolutionary people.

His activities caused some difficulties to us. Tyrants returning from exile tried to destroy the proletarian class and terrorize the people. In some local areas, our people were confused and our activities were hindered. The enemy suffered many serious failures. His key forces, including tyrants in villages and hamlets, were destroyed or worn down. His political installations both in the rural and urban areas were weakened and disorganized. When ideologically attacked by us, his administrative personnel at low levels were so demoralized that they dared not continue their work. As a consequence, the enemy could not exercise oppressive control over the people. His authorities at higher levels were increasingly isolated due to American policies. For instance, the chief of Binh-Dinh Province was accused ((of being an American henchman)) in the struggles against the US conducted on 7 and 8 Dec 70 by 40,000 students and people in Qui Nhon.

Although the enemy tried to destroy our ((local)) government, the people always put their confidence in the Revolution. They were determined to protect the revolutionary government and smash the enemy. Thus, the revolutionary government continued to stand firm in friendly controlled areas. Our political installations were increasingly developed and strengthened. The people were increasingly confident of the revolutionary government. This obviously proved that the revolutionary government was established by the people and positively serves the people. The policy and activities of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of SVN and of the diplomatic delegation, the 10-point solution of NFLSVN, the eight-point proposal of Minister Nguyen Thi Binh at the Paris Conference, etc... ((sic)), and the activities of our government at low levels increasingly heightened the prestige of the revolutionary government among the people from all walks of life in both friendly and enemy-controlled areas and exerted a great influence over the Puppet Government and Army.

For the above reasons, under the leadership of the Party, the revolutionary government at all levels, last year, succeeded in mobilizing the people ((to participate in the Revolution)), stepping up the resistance, conducting drastic struggles against the enemy pacification plan, and increasing farm production. As a result, great achievements were gained throughout the province. This helped us hinder and frustrate the pacification activities of the US and Puppet Governments in rural areas.

CDEC Doc Log No. 04-1760-71

((Page 3 of O.T.))

In 1970, our people and army in the province continuously attacked the enemy and destroyed a great part of his manpower and war facilities, including 24,671 enemy troops put out of action; 673 military vehicles destroyed; 15 storage facilities, containing 90 million liters of gasoline and 10 tons of military goods, burned; and 165 aircraft of all kinds shot down and damaged; etc... ((sic)). In addition, we conducted 665 uprising with 420,000 people, annihilated 507 tyrants and spies, suppressed 360 local administrative personnel and spies, and sent 670 others for thought reform. We also successfully destroyed four check-points; disbanded four resettlement centers in Núi Cụt, Tam Quan Nam, An Xuyên, and Vĩnh Trùng; brought 1,500 people back to their former villages; liberated 18 hamlets with 5,600 people; controlled 129 hamlets with 90,050 people; turned 153 hamlets with 85,745 people into disputed hamlets; and broke the oppressive enemy control of the population in 91 hamlets and 51 sub-hamlets with 90,318 people. The population in our controlled and disputed areas tripled in comparison with 1969.

#### Farm production:

The enemy conducted fierce attacks, but thanks to the increase of leadership of various levels and branches, we successfully increased our farm production. In lowland areas, according to reports submitted by the five districts of Hoài Nhơn, Phú Mỹ, Phú Cát, Bình Khê, and Hoài An, their cultivated surface area during the three seasons was 58,000 mau ((one mau is equal to 4,970 square meters)). There was an increase of 5,975 mau in comparison with 1969. Crops were good and the people's living conditions satisfactorily improved during 1969. In the three mountainous districts, extended enemy sweep operations greatly affected farm production. The output of rice, manioc, and corn decreased in comparison with 1969. However, thanks to the prompt leadership of the Party Committees and the revolutionary government, the people were motivated to take advantage of enemy shortcomings to increase their cultivation of manioc and corn to settle food problems during the months between crops. Generally speaking, the people's living conditions in mountainous areas were stabilized, especially those in An Lão and Văn Canh. Cadre and people in mountainous areas made great efforts during these recent times. However, the crops in mountainous areas were very poor. Individual farm production was very low, (Vĩnh Thành gathered only 136 kilograms, Văn Canh 151 kilograms, and An Lão 198 kilograms.) In the near future, serious shortage of food may occur if proper guidance is not provided for farm production.

Financial and food production activities were very slow and did not meet the requirements. The provisions collected were not enough for use. The quantity of unhusked rice, husked rice, and salt kept in reserve for large-scale campaigns was small. As of Oct 70, the entire province collected only 404 tons of rice, which was equal to 31 percent of the requirement, and 13,547,945\$ SVN, equal to 25 percent of the requirement. Self-sufficiency production rice collected was 425 tons and 288 million manioc plants. Food provisions purchased in the entire province were 1,800 tons. Phú Mỹ and Hoài Nhơn Districts were the best of all other districts because they were able to purchase a large quantity of food provisions. Our failure in finance

CDEC Doc Log No. 04-1760-71

and farm production was not due to the poor contribution of the people's effort but to the poor organization and ineffective leadership of our various echelons and branches. Along with the above shortcomings, we also met many difficulties in transportation of rice to our bases. These difficulties were caused by enemy pacification activities.

((Page 4 of O.T.))

However, in the mobilization of the people to collect and purchase rice to supply our troops and cadre (meaning the people's rear service), the local people have made great efforts in fulfilling the requirements and maintaining our activities continuously and regularly. (The opening of the entry and exit point of Mỹ Hiệp enabled us to collect thousands of tons of rice and food.)

However, the recruitment of civilian laborers, and the mobilization of youths to join the army still remains our main concern which seriously affects our military operations. Last year, districts in mountainous areas, including Vạn Cảnh District, mobilized thousands of laborers to carry ammunition and rice to the battlefields and participate in local activities. Districts in the lowlands such as Hoài Nhớn, Phú Mỹ, inspite of enemy oppression, mobilized thousands of civilian laborers during our military campaign to transport rice to Hoài Nhớn base. The whole province mobilized over 700 youths to join the army, especially in Hoài Nhớn District. In such deep areas as Tuy Phước and Bình Khê, dozens of youths were recruited to reinforce military and guerrilla units. However, the contribution of manpower for the service of our Resistance was still far below the criteria. As a result, ammunition and supplies were not timely transported to the battlefield. There were not adequate personnel to evacuate soldiers to medical stations. At times our troops had to carry ammunition or evacuate wounded soldiers.

Inspite of fierce enemy attacks and the unstable situation in liberated areas and bases, the cultural activities were regularly maintained. Primary, popular, and advanced education was regularly given to the people. At present, in liberated and lowland areas, legal and illegal schools are being formed. In Hoài Nhớn and Phú Mỹ there are 31 illegal classes with 609 students. In Hoài Nhớn, Hoài An, Phú Cát, and Bình Khê there are 49 legal classes with 2,533 students. As for popular education, only a few classes in the three mountainous districts are being maintained with 495 students. For advanced education, only six schools in the province and three districts in mountainous areas and Hoài Nhớn are being maintained with 151 students.

In brief, cultural development during the past year was slow and did not meet the requirements of the people. In liberated mountainous areas where the situation was relatively stable, we did not succeed in maintaining or developing

((Page 5 of O. T.))

popular and advanced educational programs. In lowland areas, ((GVN)) popular and advanced cultural education had long been disrupted, but we were still unable to resume our activities. No legally organized schools were initiated to rally and use children living in enemy controlled areas.

As for public health activities, although the enemy was carrying out his "rural pacification plan," our cadre in charge of public health activities in various places knew how to change their operating methods. They operated under legal status even in areas under oppressive enemy control and city bordering areas. Medical treatment was given to the people in villages, hamlets, and districts. In some places, first-aid stations were built. We promptly provided first aid for wounded and sick soldiers, cadre and the people.

The public health cadre force in both mountainous and lowland areas was strengthened. Our public health activities were aimed at maintaining and contributing the people's health to farm production. However these activities were still slow throughout the three areas. In villages and hamlets, sanitation was poor and preventive medicine was inadequate.

The policy toward war invalids was not widely disseminated or carried out among the people in local areas. However, substantial efforts were made to treat the wounded and sick soldiers at medical stations, dispensaries, and convalescence camps to improve their living conditions. The evacuation of the wounded and sick soldiers to the North was also prompt and successful.

Concerning the security task, we successfully motivated and indoctrinated the people to maintain security and heighten their vigilance against enemy espionage and psywar activities. Therefore, enemy sabotage activities were reduced, the people's life and property were effectively protected, and the situation in our areas was stabilized. During the first months of 1970, many of our people in mountainous areas were robbed of their rice, manioc, corn, pigs, and chicken. Assassinations took place in some areas. This has badly influenced the solidarity between our troops and people. However, due to the effective leadership of our Party Committees and authorities of all echelons, the preventive measures and indoctrination for cadre and troops of various units conducted by the province, and the people's high sense of revolutionary vigilance in the above cases, the local situation became calm and the general situation was stabilized.

((Page 6 of O. T.))

The above achievements are due to the sound leadership of the various Party Committee echelons, the brave revolutionary spirit of our army and people in the provinces, the endurance of hardship and sacrifices, and the iron determination of the entire cadre and soldiers. Although we attained great achievements, we still have many weak points in our tasks which adversely affected our victories. Consequently, we should gain experiences from the past activities of the revolutionary government for future tasks.

## II. ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AT VARIOUS ECHELONS.

As a result of continuous and great victories achieved by our army and people in the 1968 General Offensive and Uprising, the People's Revolutionary Government was established at all echelons of our province. However, this revolutionary government has different forms in different areas because the territory of our province is not homogeneous.

Three districts in the mountainous area were completely liberated. Therefore, village and district people's councils were elected by universal suffrage. Since mid-1968, district and village people's revolutionary committees were elected by the people's council. There were 379 members of the village people's council, 44 members of the district people's council, 174 members of the village people's revolutionary committees, and 19 members of the district people's revolutionary committees. In all villages, hamlet people's revolutionary sections with one to three members were established.

In lowlands, since the end of 1969 in Hoài Nhơn District, there were 10 out of 12 village people's councils and village people's revolutionary committees directly elected by the people, while Hoài Đức and Bồng Sơn Village had only a symbolic government agency. District echelons elected the people's council and the district people's revolutionary committee. In Phú Mỹ District there were 10 elected village people's revolutionary councils with committees in 15 villages. Two villages only elected the people's revolutionary committees with no elected people's councils. Mỹ Hòa, Mỹ Cát, and Mỹ Quang Villages have only one chairman who publicly represents the local administrative government. The district echelon already elected the district people's council and district people's revolutionary committee.

In general, the hamlets of the villages in Phú Mỹ and Hoài Nhơn Districts having a people's council established hamlet people's revolutionary sections with three to five members.

In Hoài An (Province), the elected district people's revolutionary committee has seven members. An Đức, An Hữu, An Thạnh, An Tín, and An Phong Villages have from five to seven members. Other villages are unable to establish their government.

((Page 7 of O. T.))

The People's Revolutionary Committee of Bình Khê District consisted of three members. In each of its subordinate villages there was only one committee member in charge of overt administration. In addition, Bình Giang established one committee with three members.

Various other districts such as Phú Cát, An Nhơn, and Tuy Phước have just elected members for their people's revolutionary committees but have not activated the revolutionary government.

Regarding the province level, one province people's revolutionary committee with nine members was established during the political congress held in Dec 68.

The revolutionary government at province level has been established and operating for over two years. There has been no change in the people's district and village councils and revolutionary committees in the three mountainous districts since their establishment because most of the responsible

cadre of these districts were assigned to other areas of operation. Few cadre were KIA. Regarding the lowlands, through the enemy accelerated and special pacification activities, many cadre were KIA and many others were assigned to various other areas of operation. For that reason, most of the district, village, and hamlet people's councils and revolutionary committees were disorganized. In some areas, there were few members, therefore, our task of improving and strengthening them was not carried out on time. In some others, the revolutionary government was activated in a perfunctory manner. It has not really operated and has no intrinsic nature and authority. There was a shortage of standing and administrative cadre of various district and village revolutionary committees. Various district and village specialized sections have been established for a long time, but because of enemy sabotage activities, many cadre have been sacrificed and have not yet been replaced. As a result, all work has had to be postponed. With the above shortcomings, the activation of the revolutionary government in newly liberated areas has not been settled yet. For instance, in An Nhón, through the Summer-Spring Campaign, we have gained the control of several inter-villages and hamlets, but we still failed to activate a revolutionary government in this area to use its prestige to motivate the people to intensify their resistance against the enemy and strongly strengthen and protect the people's force.

The recruitment and improvement of cadre of various levels of the revolutionary government have not been satisfactorily implemented. Although cadre of the province level have been assigned to Hoài Nhón, Phú Mỹ, Vĩnh Thanh, and An Lão Districts to conduct training for district and village cadre, the total of attendants were very few. Besides, various districts also conduct training classes for village cadre but their results were unsatisfactory. Worse yet, after attending training, many cadre have changed their tasks requirements and have not properly complied with the policy prescribed during the training. At present, almost all governmental cadre are very young and inexperienced. They do not fully understand the organizations, missions, responsibility, capability, authority, and working procedures of the revolutionary government and are very clumsy and unskillful in their specialized task.

((Page 8 of O. T.))

Working procedures of the government are not proper. Its principles and activities prescribed for its cadre from higher to lower echelons have not been strictly observed. The purpose of the task and the working methods of the councils and committees have not been carefully studied. Regulations concerning the coordination between the committees and various specialized sections have not been clearly prescribed. The coordination of operations with various popular organizations is not close. Principles concerning the submission of reports and request of instructions from higher echelons have not been properly complied with. Specific methods have not been set forth to deal with the characteristic of each area.

0000 000 000 NO. 04-1100-11

Such poor organization has badly affected all activities of the revolutionary government during these recent times.

Concerning our activities in villages and hamlets as mentioned above, the revolutionary government and all echelons have concentrated all efforts on the motivation of the people to strengthen their unity and determination to defeat the US aggressors; completely frustrate the enemy accelerated and special pacification programs and his Vietnamization plan; counter his clear and sweep operations conducted on our bases; be determined to hold on to rice fields and arable lands; increase and protect farm production in order to improve living conditions and make contributions for the Revolution; maintain and develop the education, public health, motivation, and organization of the people to eliminate all enemy sabotage activities; protect and strengthen our liberated and base areas; maintain security and order within the units; and protect the people and their property. Generally speaking, all activities of the revolutionary government are still weak. Formerly, all its activities were conducted regularly, but later they became less frequent. Besides, when the situation was stabilized, all its activities were successful. However, when it met difficulties, all activities stopped. In some areas, governmental cadre did not pay attention to the activities of the revolutionary government and were not enthusiastic in their specialized task. As a result, all ((administrative)) activities were not closely coordinated with those of various branches and popular organizations. Also, the revolutionary government did not pay attention to the principle mission and did not use its power and prestige to the utmost to strongly promote its violence in collaborating with the people to continuously wage struggles and uprisings, eliminate tyrants, break up the oppressive enemy control, win over the people, and protect the revolutionary government. The experiences gained in the past have proved that in areas where local cadre knew how to promote the revolutionary violence by issuing notices, circulars, warning letters, or using oppressive measures and punishment against the ((RVN)) local administrative personnel and tyrants with the cooperation of the people, they succeeded in stepping up the people's movement as well as strengthening their enthusiasm. Thus, the victories they achieved were amazing. If the people's and the revolutionary government's activities are closely coordinated to launch continuous attacks on the enemy, his local administration will soon be disorganized and the Puppet Government will gradually become ineffective.

((The following two sentences were crossed out in O.T.))

Causes for the above situation:

The authorities at various echelons were newly established and still lacked experience.



CDEC Doc Log No. 04-1760-71

((Page 9 of O.T.))

In short, through the recent organization and activities of the revolutionary government, the following strong and weakpoints still existed:

Though newly established and operating under unfavorable conditions with fierce attacks by the enemy, our government still existed and could develop activities effectively throughout areas, especially in local government. The prestige and reputation of our government grows with each passing day among the people living in enemy and friendly areas.

In mountainous areas, our government took real and effective measures to develop the people's guerrilla warfare movement, counter enemy sweep operations and destruction, mobilize manpower and material resources to serve the front line, and increase and protect production to improve the people's living condition. These strong points are due to the effective and specific activities of our government which affect the people's life and sentiment. They dared to sacrifice everything to support and protect the revolutionary government. Party Committees at all levels paid particular attention to supporting and maintaining the revolutionary government.

However, some shortcomings still remain:

The authority at all levels are not strengthened. Higher leadership was not improved and local governments were not well established throughout areas. Cadre were not assigned flexibly. They were not well trained and their skills were not improved. Therefore, they were confused in their tasks.

The government failed to conduct effective activities. It did not improve its working procedures or properly carry out missions in accordance with its functions. It did not have appropriate methods of activity for each area and exert all efforts to serve the main mission which is to break the oppressive enemy control and control the people.

These shortcomings are due to:

The lack of experience and effectiveness of activities of government at all levels. In addition: it had to operate under unfavorable conditions, with different features of the battlefield.

A large number of cadre did not fully realize the present role and function of the revolutionary government to motivate the people to push the resistance forward and attain complete victory by political solution for forthcoming phases. They thought that it is not necessary to establish a government which was merely a matter of form to better the Party's activities, therefore, they did not pay attention to strengthening the government. They displayed

CDEC Doc Log No. 04-1760-71

((Page 10 of O.T.))

rightism and shirking attitudes. For instance, when our cadre started the control of the people, they dared not immediately establish a revolutionary government to operate legally, or they operated only when the situation was favorable. They did not properly play their role to strongly develop the power of the government and create favorable conditions to highly promote the people's movement. They failed to properly coordinate combat activities with strengthening the government task. For instance, while the movement of breaking the oppressive enemy control and controlling the people was developed to the utmost, the strengthening of revolutionary government, especially that of local government, was not developed in compliance with the common movement. The government did not properly provide leadership to the people and flexibly assign qualified cadre to perform the government task. Cadre also failed to urge and inspect the government activities and provide favorable conditions for the government at all levels to perform its function and role in order to transform the government into a competent tool of the Party.

## PART II

### III. MISSION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1971.

#### 1. Assessment of the forthcoming plan of the enemy:

Our resistance against US for national salvation has obtained greater victories. The people's revolutionary government has been established from central echelons to hamlets and villages. It mobilized the people to build up a force to defeat the enemy. However, the US imperialists and their henchmen were still stubborn, did not give up their scheme of aggression, and established neocolonialism. They strove to implement the Vietnamization plan and the pacification program with an attempt to destroy the revolutionary government and establish Puppet administrative machinery in order to oppress and exploit our people. These enemy schemes were destroyed by our troops and people. In mountainous areas, they will carry out the tactic of intercepting our ((VC)) forces from a distance, attacking our lines of communication, intensifying Special Forces, spy, and reconnaissance activities, and spraying chemical toxics to destroy our production and economic activities, and cause difficulties to the people's living conditions. They will destroy our agencies, storage facilities, disrupt the situation in our bases, and cause difficulties to our activities.

In controlled and disputed areas, they will conduct fierce attacks to relocate the people and repel our revolutionary forces and local government.

((Page 11 of O.T.))

In controlled and disputed areas, the enemy will conduct fierce attacks to eliminate our revolutionary forces and agents and strive to relocate the people. In parallel with these activities, he will consolidate the low echelons of the Puppet government, establish a covert government and espionage system to oppress the people, and implement his pacification plan that was seriously frustrated by our army and people.

CDEC Doc Log No. 04-1760-71

In enemy district seats, province capitals, and temporary controlled areas, he has strove to consolidate the Puppet Government to prepare for the next presidential election ((1971)), intensify psywar, deceitful and demagogic activities to bribe the people, and investigate and drive our forces out of his controlled areas to heighten his prestige and lower ours.

In the face of his cunning plans and tricks, we should increase our vigilance. However, he has been seriously defeated by our army and people. For that reason, Puppet troops and their government, including US and satellite troops, have been seriously demoralized. This fact has adversely affected their capabilities and activities.

2. However, we still have the following difficulties main advantages:

a. Difficulties:

The situation in our controlled areas (including mountainous and lowland areas) have not yet been stabilized. The development and consolidation of forces of the people's revolutionary government will meet many difficulties, especially in the organization of cadre.

The revolutionary government's activities concerning social warfare, democracy, and mobilization of manpower and material resources for the resistance, as well as the promotion of its prestige in friendly and enemy areas, were considerably limited.

Cadre have not yet realized the role and position of the ((revolutionary)) government. Because it was newly established and lacked experiences they fail to fulfil the requirements of the common situation. Therefore, they met difficulties in implementation of tasks.

b. However, we still have the following main advantages:

Our army and people absolutely believe in the revolutionary government. They constantly sharpen their hatred for the enemy, and are unable to endure enemy oppression. Therefore, they are determined to overthrow the Puppet Government to gain the control of the country and establish the revolutionary government.

((Page 12 of O.T.))

The people's struggle movement in many places and even in province capitals has been strongly developed. Their organizations have been strongly developed. Their organizations have been strengthened. Puppet Government and troops have been confused and demoralized. These constituted conditions favorable for our attacks against the Puppet Government to seize power.

The Party's leadership over the authorities of higher echelons is being improved. With practical experiences gained from past activities they will gradually develop their effectiveness.

CDEC Doc Log No. 04-1760-71

Due to the effective leadership given to lower echelons, they have closely coordinated the armed activities of the government and the people's violence. Therefore, they have successfully broken the oppressive enemy control of the population, killed tyrants, won over the people, seized power, and improved our government.

### 3. Common mission and specific missions:

#### a. Our common mission is to:

Strive to establish and strengthen the revolutionary government at all echelons, especially at village and hamlet levels. Broadly and constantly develop the local government; motivate the people to join the Resistance; suppress antirevolutionaries; maintain law and order; better the people's living conditions, and heighten their sense of mastership; develop the prestige of the revolutionary government; intensify its violent power and combine it with that of the people; step up our political offensive; eliminate enemy tyrants and control; smash his village administrative systems; neutralize his district governments; frustrate his pacification plan; and basically gain and hold the population and a major part of the rural areas and plains.

#### b. Specific missions:

To fulfill the above cited common mission, all branches and governmental echelons should implement the following main tasks:

1. Motivate the people to unite, rise up, kill tyrants, break the enemy control, crush his administrative machinery, frustrate his pacification program, and gain and hold the population.

The people's revolutionary government at all echelons should develop its role, function, and power to fulfill this main mission prescribed by the Party.

In enemy controlled areas, cities, and towns, the revolutionary government should try by all appropriate means to develop its prestige and power and combine them with those of the people to break the oppressive enemy control, kill tyrants, gain and hold the population, and smash enemy village administrative systems in order to establish the people's revolutionary government.

((Page 13 of C.T.))

In liberated and enemy controlled and disputed areas, the people should be motivated to rise up to smash the enemy rural pacification plan, kill tyrants, break oppressive control of the population, disorganize the People's Self-Defense Force units, win over the population, destroy his posts, and expand and hold on to liberated areas and strengthen them in all fields.

The local administration and branches at all levels in mountainous areas should positively support the four main current motivations with the aim of stepping up and protecting ((farm)) production for the improvement of the people's living conditions.

2. Motivation of manpower and material resources to serve the Resistance:

The Resistance against the US imperialists for national salvation of our people requires increasingly great manpower and material resources. The people's revolutionary government of all echelons must motivate the people to participate in the Resistance in local areas by joining the hamlet and village guerrilla forces, building combat hamlets and villages, fighting the enemy with weapons to protect their villages, and carrying out rear service tasks. They must also mobilize manpower and material resources to serve the front line by motivating youths to join the revolutionary army, assault youth force, revolutionary organizations, and civilian laborers to serve the battlefield, conducting requisition and purchase activities, and preparing rice for immediate and future use.

Criteria and specific plans have been prescribed for various branches. The authorities of all echelons should provide specific leadership, inspect their activities, and combine the missions to insure the attainment of criteria in our ((liberated)) areas and even in enemy controlled areas.

3. Improvement of the material, spiritual, cultural, and social life of the people:

The Party is the center of the people's revolutionary government. The Party is an essential organization of the government. The following tasks should be carried out.

Strictly observe the people's ownership and rights of freedom and independence.

Increase and protect ((farm)) production to heighten the people's living condition. Settle all problems concerning land for farmers upon seizure of power. Conduct struggles against the false land reform policy of the US and Puppet Governments. Protect all revolutionary achievements and lives and property of the people.

Develop and maintain the education, signal, public health, and social missions.

Better people's living conditions in liberated and ((VC)) controlled areas.

((Page 14 of O.T.))

We should enhance the people's morale and maintain and develop solidarity in rural areas.

CDEJ DOC LOG NO. 04-1/00-11

4. We should be determined to suppress antirevolutionaries, initiate security maintenance movement, and maintain order and security:

The US imperialists and their henchmen, by all ways and means, recruit spies and plant them in our liberated areas to investigate our activities, frustrate our revolutionary movement, and sow disturbance in our areas. The people's revolutionary government is a tool of the Party and the working class to suppress antirevolutionaries and eliminate local ((RVN)) administrative personnel and spies and those who continue to secretly operate in our areas. We should maintain security and establish security networks (both covert and overt) among the people. We should indoctrinate or suppress those who break order and security in society. We should eliminate bad elements among the people, strengthen solidarity, and increase social welfare.

5. We should make every effort to strengthen the people's revolutionary government in all fields:

We should try to fulfil the following three requirements:

a. Strengthen and consolidate our organizations:

We should strengthen the government system, especially the government at infrastructure organizations. Only when the local government is consolidated can we consolidate the central government. However, we should consolidate the central government and provide conditions for the development of the revolutionary government in local areas. In general, the district should build up hamlet and village government. In the future, we should strengthen the district government and create more favorable conditions for the consolidation of infrastructure government.

The revolutionary government should be established throughout the country. We should elect people's revolutionary committees and councils and consolidate various specialized branches to enable the administrative machinery to operate regularly everywhere. Personnel should be assigned to standing committees at all echelons.

In district seats and province capitals or areas where the government has not yet been established, we should activate people's revolutionary committees. We should motivate the people to suppress antirevolutionaries and step up all tasks in support of the principal mission which is to eliminate the enemy and control the population, thus increasing the prestige of the government. In addition, we should attack the enemy politically. As soon as an area

((Page 15 of O.T.))

is controlled, we should establish the revolutionary government and popular associations. We should pay attention to establishing paramilitary, political, and security forces and motivate the people to build combat hamlets and villages and contribute resources and manpower to support

CDEC Doc Log No. 04-1760-71

the Resistance. We should intensify ((farm)) production activities, provide guidance for public health and cultural education, launch three-front attacks against the enemy, suppress tyrants, maintain order and security, protect the people's lives and property, control the situation, and protect the revolutionary government.

In liberated areas where the situation is favorable, we should re-elect the people's revolutionary council at the end of its term. In areas where the situation does not permit, we should select people to replace or reinforce the people's councils and committees. We should consolidate specialized branches and people's revolutionary committees. At hamlet level, activate hamlet Party civil affairs committees and maintain and intensify the people's council activities. While selecting members to reinforce the local government, emphasis should be placed on recruiting people of the working class. The local government should concentrate activities on countering the enemy pacification program, consolidating liberated areas in all fields, and taking care of the people's lives.

In base areas where the office term of the people's council and committees ended, districts should initiate election campaigns from now to the end of May 71 to elect new councils and committees. District and village committees should consolidate hamlet people's revolutionary committees. District and village specialized sections should assign personnel to be in charge of the administration in Dam ((sic)). In the course of the election campaign, we should motivate the people to initiate an emulation phase in mountainous areas for stepping up farm production activities and protecting crops. The former people's councils and committees should hold meetings to review past activities and disseminate experiences to the new councils and committees. The majority of the members in people's revolutionary councils and committees should be from the proletarian class and 60 percent of the members should be young people and females.

The administrative machinery should be compact to insure successful accomplishment of the task ((in wartime)). However, we should avoid simplism. In the present situation, we should establish groups to be in charge of finance and economy and cultural and social welfare. These groups will be responsible for their own activities and will coordinate with various governmental branches and popular associations such as Farmers', Youth's and Women's Associations.

Rural regulations should be establish or improved as required. The government should also closely coordinate with popular associations to conduct indoctrination on regulations.

((Page 16 of O.T.))

All individuals and subordinate units that properly observe the rural regulations should be recommended for awards. Those who violated the above regulations should be severely punished.

b. We should strive to make every effort to train cadre:

The essential point is to strive to train as many hamlet and village cadre as possible in order to reinforce the government. The immediate requirement is to make our cadre fully understand the fundamental policy, the responsibility and the mission of the government, the organization of administrative machinery, the working procedures, and the ethics of government cadre. All echelons should work out a plan to train cadre. From now to Jun 71, at least one half of the council members and one third of the committee members of all echelons should undergo one basic training course. All committee secretaries of various echelons should improve administrative skills.

The region is responsible for improving district and province cadre, while the province is responsible for training village and hamlet cadre. The district is in charge of improving task performance of hamlet and village cadre and conducting training for all village and hamlet people's revolutionary council members. Provinces will work out activity plans to help districts conduct training courses. In order to insure successful training, provinces and districts in mountainous areas and Hoài Nhõn and Phú Mỹ should conduct training courses to continuously train and improve ((administrative)) cadre's knowledge. Provinces should help other districts implement the above task.

The training of cadre and the strengthening of administrative machinery should be in harmony with combat and ((farm)) production activities, the people's welfare, and the application of democracy. Therefore, we should step up the above activities simultaneously. Furthermore, we should not forget the task of training cadre regularly and strengthening the administrative machinery step by step.

Along with the training of cadre, we should pay attention to the establishment and the management of the village budget, especially allowances for village and hamlet cadre. We should take care of the people's lives and control the village budget to promptly correct mistakes. The village estimated budget should be approved by all members of district people's revolutionary council. Provinces should provide guidance for villages to establish and manage village budgets in areas where the situation is favorable. Province and district people's revolutionary committees should pay attention to promptly commend or promote those who have good ethics and who gain the people's sympathy. Those who cause the people's rights or act to the detriment of the prestige of the revolutionary government must be severely punished.



CDEC Doc Log No. 04-1760-71

((Page 17 of O.T.))

c. Administrative procedures applicable to all echelons of government:

In order to really develop the working procedures of every task, the government of each level should properly establish working procedures and the method of performing tasks.

Proper attention should be paid to the following tasks in mountainous base, liberated, and friendly controlled areas:

Establish the working procedures of government, Party, and Group as well as the Party Committee echelon to insure effective and absolute leadership of the Party and government (to be conducted at district level).

Establish the working procedures of councils and committees of all levels.

Establish the working procedures of committees as well as specialized sections. The working procedures of the government and those of people's associations should be coordinated.

Organize conferences to discuss specialized services in order to strengthen the office committee of all levels and establish their working procedures.

Properly implement the reporting procedures of lower echelons and branches to government committees and Party Committees to insure unified and complete leadership.

In enemy controlled areas and suburbs where the revolutionary government has been established only for form's sake, local Party Committee members should develop its prestige; intensify the elimination of tyrants and the enemy control; gain and hold the people; exhibit the revolutionary government power under various forms, such as issuing communiques, ordinary denunciations or appeals, and organizing justice courts to punish tyrants and local administrative personnel and spies. They should also motivate the people to conduct uprisings, break the enemy control, gain the mastership, and contribute manpower and resources to the Resistance. They can levy taxes in the name of the revolutionary government to provide the people with a legal status to oppose the enemy authorities by waging political struggles. The primary task of these areas is to develop the violent power of the revolutionary government along with that of the people to boost the Revolution to its apex in contribution to the fulfillment of our main mission.

## Recapitulative experience:

The people's revolutionary government has been newly activated. Therefore, the establishment of ((administrative)) machinery of all levels, training of cadre, establishment of working procedures and leadership of all activity branches were poor. Therefore, we should make a recapitulative report to gain experience for the future leadership and improve government cadre at the same time. For now to Jun 71, two recapitulative reports should be made at the end of Mar and May 71. The reports should be submitted to the province to be ready for the province and region government meeting.

CDEC Doc Log No. 04-1760-71

((Page 18 of O.T.))

To successfully carry out the above mission, we must properly assess the following problems concerning command and leadership:

1. We should make cadre of all ranks and branches clearly understand the basic problems concerning the role, mission responsibility, and capability of the people's revolutionary government. They must realize the significance and importance of the establishment of the ((revolutionary)) government in the present situation as well as when a political solution is sought. They realize the content ((cause)) and objective of our fight for democracy and social welfare. Yet, our government will successfully motivate our people in all areas; organize and lead them to fight the enemy, kill tyrants, eliminate traitors, break up the Puppet Government oppressive machinery to seize power; and improve the people's living conditions.

2. Our ((revolutionary)) government must be established on a strong foundation with the support of the people and the strength and power of friendly armed forces. Therefore, local government at all levels must create favorable conditions for ((civilian)) revolutionary organizations to operate in coordination with other organizations and branches in order to strengthen political and armed forces which will become staunch supporters of the revolutionary government.

3. We should pay particular attention to strengthening our organizations, chiefly our administrative organizations at low levels (villages and hamlets), on both structure and ideology. Train and improve our cadre on specialized tasks and turn administrative authorities at all levels into a principal and effective tool of our Party and people. Only in doing so can we fully and widely develop the practical effectiveness of the ((revolutionary)) government.

4. We must understand the correlation between attacks and the strengthening of the local revolutionary government:

In conjunction with the people's uprising movement, which is aimed at destroying the enemy administrative government to seize power, we must immediately establish our own government to replace it. At the same time, we should strengthen our forces, intensify our activities, and learn practical lessons to successfully strengthen our government.

((Page 19 of O.T.))

5. Strengthen the Party's leadership over the revolutionary government and create favorable conditions for its operation and development of its specific efficiency.

#### IV. PLAN FOR ESTABLISHING GOVERNMENT IN VARIOUS ECHELONS (from Nov to Jun 71).

##### A. Mountainous areas:

##### I. CONTENTS AND REQUIREMENTS:

1. We should strive to establish and consolidate the revolutionary government from district to village and hamlet (including re-election of district Party Committees and councils and consolidation of specialized branches from district down to people's revolutionary sections in hamlets).

UDEC DOC LOG NO. 04-1/00-11

2. We should improve more professional skills for our cadre in various echelons and pay attention to activities of village and hamlet cadre. Conduct meetings to indoctrinate the people and make them fully aware of the revolutionary government's basic problems.

3. We should improve working procedures and work out appropriate plans for the government in various echelons in an attempt to develop the specific role for the revolutionary government in the present broad campaign. In mountainous areas, the intensifying and protection of farm production is a main task in strengthening our base.

## II. PROGRAMS AND MEASURES:

They are divided into two steps as follows:

First step, from now to Mar 71.

Second step, from Apr to Jun 71.

((Page 20 of O.T.))

First step: The requirement of this step is to consolidate the people's councils, the people's district and village revolutionary Party Committees, the people's hamlet revolutionary sections, and various specialized sections in districts and hamlets. Conduct short-term training courses for district and village cadre. Improve working procedures of the councils and district and village Party Committees and help them to carry out their assigned missions.

To meet the above requirements, we should successfully implement the following missions:

1. Consolidate village councils, Party Committees, and the people's hamlet revolutionary Party Committees. Recruit more agents in charge of standing elements for district and village Party Committees.

2. Conduct short-term training courses for village command cadre to improve their function and competency and working procedures of the councils and Party Committees. Conduct training courses for hamlet cadre at experimental sites.

3. Hold a meeting to review the mission of establishing the revolutionary government at districts (with the participation of personnel of the people's councils, district Party Committees, specialized branches, village chiefs, village committee members, and secretaries. Gain experiences for the upcoming task. If any district cannot conduct training courses, a number of cadre of that district should be indoctrinated and trained at this meeting on the program of the short-term training course (in Jan 71).

4. Conduct meetings to review recent activities, missions, and improvement of working procedures of the councils and Party Committees (in Feb 71).

5. Regulate activities of specialized sections from district down to village by consolidating them qualitatively and quantitatively (in Mar 71).

6. Prescribe regulations for mountainous areas (which were passed by the people's village councils and approved by the district in Feb 71). The specific instruction of the district Party Committee will be sent later.

Second step: The requirement of this step is to successfully implement the re-election of the people's councils and the people's district and village revolutionary Party Committees. This step will be developed into a broad political motivation phase in mountainous areas, aimed at heightening the knowledge of the revolutionary government and sense of leadership of cadre of branches and associations and motivating the people to enthusiastically participate in the four campaigns and to establish our bases.

The following missions should be implemented in the second step:

1. Indoctrinate the people and cadre to make them aware of basic problems of the revolutionary government (including organization, mission capability, and responsibility of the people's councils and the people's revolutionary Party Committees) and of their obligations toward the government. Motivate the people to compete in obtaining achievements for the celebration of election of the people's councils and the people's revolutionary Party Committee (Section II in Mar 71).

2. Activate civic action department and draft a voters' registration list (in Mar 71).

3. The people's councils and the people's district and village revolutionary Party Committees should conduct meetings to review activities, point out the recent weaknesses and strengths, and disseminate the election program (in Apr 71).

((Page 21 of O.T.))

4. Conduct the election of the people's councils and people's revolutionary committees at district and village level (in May 71).

5. A review of the experiences gained through this election should be initiated by the concerned districts and villages in order to find out all strong and weak points and develop greater achievements.

Review preliminary reports of the emulation phase to mete out awards and initiate other emulation phases. An official ceremony will be organized for ((new)) members of the district and village people's ((revolutionary)) council and people's revolutionary committees.

These councils and committees will work out an activity plan for the second half of 1971, including internal prescribed regulations and standard working procedures.

#### B. In lowland areas:

##### I. CONTENTS AND REQUIREMENT:

Our basic requirement is to consolidate administrative machineries in various liberated districts, villages, and hamlets and seize power.

In addition to breaking the oppressive enemy control, annihilating tyrants, and winning over the people, we must also successfully establish the revolutionary government ((sections)) in friendly ((VC/NVA)) newly controlled villages and hamlets.

CDEC Doc Log No. 04-1760-71

Establish the revolutionary government in villages, in disputed or weak areas, areas under temporary enemy ((RVN)) control, and in ((enemy controlled)) province capitals or district seats.

The responsibilities, capabilities, and missions of the ((revolutionary)) government in our ((VC/NVA)) controlled areas must be fulfilled. Also, we must enhance the prestige of our revolutionary government in enemy controlled areas in order to motivate the people to intensively achieve the principal mission which is to kill tyrants, break the oppressive enemy control, destroy the local administration, win over the people, seize power and consolidate our areas.

## II. PLAN AND MEASURES:

There are three steps.

Step 1: From now to Mar 71, the requirement of this phase is to consolidate and strengthen the local administration in districts, villages, and hamlets.

### 1. In Hoai Nhon and Phu My ((Districts)):

a. In districts and villages where the people's revolutionary council and people's revolutionary committee have been already activated and to activate the people's council and people's revolutionary committee in districts and villages, we must hold a meeting of military and civilian elements of the district or village to elect representatives to fill vacant seats. Any people's revolutionary councils that have only a small number of members should be re-elected.

Conduct a people's council meeting of the entire district or village to elect representatives for the people's revolutionary committee.

((Page 22 of O.T.))

If the people's council is re-elected, the people's revolutionary committee of the same level must be also re-elected. Consolidate the offices of districts, village committees, the specialized sections, and the hamlet people's revolutionary sections. Ensure adequate personnel for duty performance.

The people's council in district and village committees must hold a meeting with the participation of various specialized sections, group organizations at the same level, and subordinate administrative machineries to discuss missions, responsibilities, and capabilities and the authorities and working procedures of the council and committees.

They should discuss different tasks and make decisions. They should also appeal to the entire population to step up ((farm)) production and resistance activities to counter the enemy pacification plan in order to maintain power and consolidate our areas.

b. ((sic)) In villages where there are people's revolutionary committees, but without people's councils:

There are two cases: In villages already liberated or under our control, a conference should be held with the participation of our soldiers and people to elect the village people's council. The latter will elect the village people's revolutionary committee.

In villages where the situation is unstabilized, a military and civilian congress must be held to partly or completely elect a village people's revolutionary committee.

Consolidate and establish people's revolutionary sections in hamlets and in areas under our control or mixed control. Establish uprising sections (preceeding form of the revolutionary government) in other hamlets. (Decisions will be made either by the people's council or by the people's revolutionary committee.)

Improve the specialized sections in villages and hamlets (decisions will be made by the people's councils or the people's revolutionary committees).

Afterward, an enlarged conference of the people's council or people's revolutionary committee will be held to review performance of the above activities.

c. In villages, including district seats where the administrative government has not been activated:

A military and civilian conference should be conducted in village and district seats to elect the people's revolutionary committee. If cadre are not available. Party Committee echelons should operate in the name of the people's revolutionary committees to heighten the prestige of the revolutionary government. People should be motivated to carry out activities of breaking up oppressive enemy control, annihilating tyrants, and seizing power. We must lead the people to demand social welfare and democracy and launch political attacks against the enemy.

2. In other districts and province capitals:

At district level:

Hold a conference with the participation of our soldiers and people in the entire district to consolidate already activated people's revolutionary committees or new people's revolutionary committees.

((Page 23 of O.T.))

We should organize a ceremony to present new members of the people's revolutionary committees, appeal to the people to oppose the enemy special pacification plan, kill tyrants, break the enemy control, consolidate and expand our controlled areas, and protect the people's lives. The people's district revolutionary committees should step up overt activities such as killing tyrants, breaking enemy control, suppressing counterrevolutionaries, and motivating the people to implement their food requisition and purchasing task in order to enhance the prestige of the revolutionary government.

After consolidating and completing the election, the people's revolutionary committees of various districts should hold meetings to work out activity plans, prescribe activity regulations, consolidate specialized sections in the districts, and assign adequate cadre to the district party committees for operation.

For our ((VC)) controlled villages and disrupted areas:

We should hold a meeting for the army and the people in all villages for the selection of the people's village revolutionary committee. New members

the prestige of the revolutionary government in both friendly and enemy controlled areas. Each people's village revolutionary committee should hold a meeting to work out activity plans, strengthen activity regulations, appeal to the people to actively participate in our farm production task, support the front line, fight enemy troops to protect our villages, heighten the revolutionary achievements gained, and develop our armed, political, and security forces to consolidate the agencies of the revolutionary government and gain power.

Each people's village revolutionary committee should be determined to establish the people's revolutionary section in our controlled hamlets and disputed ones. In addition, uprising sections should be activated in other hamlets. Some essential specialized sections, such as security, farm production, finance and trade, food provisions, communication and transportation, communication and postal transportation, and public health and education sections, must be activated in villages in order to develop activities of the revolutionary government among the people.

Areas loosely and temporarily controlled by the enemy and district seats:

We should hold meetings among the army and people for the election of the people's village revolutionary committees. Legal cadre are to be selected to participate in these committees. The people's village revolutionary committees can be established by the district revolutionary committee in areas where the meetings cannot be held. In areas where cadre are inadequate, the members of village Party Committees or Party Chapters should also take charge of the people's village revolutionary committees. However, in these areas, all overt activities are carried out under the name of the people's local revolutionary committees. This is done to enhance the prestige of the revolutionary government.

We should establish an uprising committee in each hamlet in order to conduct motivation and provide leadership for the people to rise up to gain the power. The people's hamlet revolutionary committee must be established along with the successful motivation of the people in each hamlet.

The people's village revolutionary committee should hold meetings to work out the activity plan, appeal to the people to kill tyrants, break the enemy control, and gain power.

Step 3: Lasting from Apr to Jun 71. The requirements of this step are to train and improve cadre of the revolutionary government at all levels and prescribe tasks and activity regulations for the councils and the revolutionary committees in districts, villages, and hamlets, in order to promote the role, capability, and responsibility of the revolutionary government among the people of all classes.

((Page 24 of O.T.))

The training is aimed at heightening the will to fight, absolute revolutionary spirit, the understanding of the policy of our revolutionary Party, revolutionary ethics, knowledge of our rights and responsibilities, and the organization and operating procedure of the government at all levels.

Substantial missions of this step:

a. Committee X ((sic)) should form a training course for key cadre of all district and village committees (in March 1971).

b. Committee X helps the districts of Hoài Nhơn, Phù Mỹ, Vĩnh Thanh, An Lao conduct courses for all the district and village councils and committees (in Apr and May, 71).

c. Afterwards, under the leadership of Committee X, the districts will open courses for village councils and committees and help the villages form short-term refresher courses for cadre of all people's hamlet revolutionary committees of hamlets.

d. Committee X will hold a conference to instruct district committees on committee office operations (Apr 71). Afterwards, similar conferences for villages will be organized.

The criteria for training in this step:

Give training to all key cadre of districts and village committees (including the Chairman, members, and secretaries) and one third of the committee members and one half of the district and village people's council members.

Each hamlet village, district, and branch should assign one person to undergo a training course of the district or province ((sic)).

Step III:

Outline strong and weak points and learn lessons from the first two steps in strengthening our government to improve our cadre and formulate an activity plan for the last half of 1971.

In late May 71, the district committee will meet with all villages. Report on the meeting should be submitted to Committee X in early Jun 71. In late Jun 71, Committee X will hold a preliminary meeting to draw out experiences and draft plans for consolidating the local government for the last half of 1971.

- - - - - END OF TRANSLATION - - - - -